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The volume seeks to re-connect law and political economy, both understood in
very broad terms. My contribution provides an additional perspective on this theme,
and discusses the place of political economy (or rather its conspicuous absence)
in the constitutional imaginary of Europe, which has dominated much of the last
three decades. It originated, in the words of Antoine Vauchez, ‘in the hills of Fiesole
between Badia Fiesolana and the Villa Schifanoia’ (now of course Villa Salviati).
Joseph Weiler’s The Transformation of Europe is the foundational piece of this
imaginary. I have recently analysed Transformation and discussed it at the place of
its birth. This contribution builds on that analysis.  
I firstly explain what I mean by constitutional imaginary and present Transformation
as such. I stress its neglect for questions of political economy, something that has
marked much of the European constitutional scholarship at least until the Eurocrisis
(and probably even beyond that). In the final part I will argue, using constitutional
imaginary as a heuristic tool, that European economic constitutionalism, which was
emerging from the hills of Fiesole at the time when Transformation’s imaginary
dominated the field, is not able to fully grasp some questions of constitutional
political economy. We need to move beyond Fiesole.
Why “Constitutional Imaginary”?
Constitutional imaginaries are sets of ideas and beliefs that help to motivate and
at the same time justify the practice of government and collective self-rule. They
are as important as institutions and office-holders. They provide political action with
an overarching sense and purpose recognized by those governed as legitimate.
Constitutional imaginaries can be seen as ‘necessary fictions’ that make political
rule possible, or as ideologies understood in (post-) Marxist terms as a ‘means of
domination’.
Constitutional imaginaries conceal from citizens some negative impacts of their
central principles. Unconstrained commitment to international free trade agreements
(as part of a neo-liberal imaginary) can make some people (feel) ‘left behind’ – and
dominated by those who benefit from intensive international cooperation. The latter
may not even realise their domination – until it is revealed by a radical result in a
referendum or a presidential election as we saw after the Brexit vote or the election
of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States.
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Constitutional imaginary is built on a tension, recently explored by Martin Loughlin in
his Chorley lecture at the LSE. Imaginary – both at the level of an individual person
who is co-producing it, and at the level of a society, where such imaginary forms
part of its collective experience, is ideological and utopian. It is ideological since in
the interest of creating the society (or community), it supresses the individual and
her preferences, needs or experience. Any belonging to the collective is such; the
alternative being the aggregate of individuals, each different in their own sphere, not
shared with others except through contracting. It is also utopian, since it gives the
polity, which is constituted through the imaginary, a direction, or horizon – although it
remains out of its reach.
A number of central concepts – ‘contested truths’ form part (not the whole) of a
constitutional imaginary. They are essential to the practice of government, and yet
unsettled. It is around them that important political (and also legal-constitutional)
arguments turn – be it the nature of statehood and sovereignty, the constitution
and its identity, democracy, rights (human and/or fundamental), or freedom – the
dominant ethical category of the modern society. They are part of the conceptual
vocabulary of modern public law and politics.
Importantly, constitutional imaginaries are very much dependent on the underlying
notions of political economy – and vice versa. They are interdependent, as some
authors in the German debate on the ordering of law and economy knew well.
Ordoliberals put the relationship between law and economy at the centre of their
work, as discussed in Christian Joerges and Michele Everson’s contribution to the
volume and explored, in the context of private law, by Marija Bartl.
To take one example, market can be seen as a source of freedom – and the
imaginary of the government, individual and her rights will follow from that. Market
can be alternatively understood as a potential place of domination, which people, in
order to gain freedom, need to control through their rights and collective government.
The shape of the market will however (hence the interdependence) reflect its legal
constitution – whether it will be a neoliberal “market without adjectives”, as some
proponents of economic reforms of the 1990s argued, or a market embedded
(through regulation) in a polity and its law.
Unfortunately, this insight has never penetrated the theory of European
constitutionalism. True, there was European Economic Constitutionalism, but for
a very long time the mainstream constitutional debate ‘benignly neglected’ the
questions of political economy. Moreover, as I argue below, even the latter theory
did not grasp some important questions that need to be addressed through “law of
political economy”.
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Transformation as a Constitutional Imaginary at
the “End of History” and the Beginning of a “New
Europe”
Lawyers, and especially more philosophically oriented lawyers with a foot in legal
and political practice, are important co-producers of constitutional imaginaries.
Joseph Weiler represents one of them, arguably the most influential in the two
decades between 1989 and the beginning of the Eurocrisis in 2010. Transformation
(which was being conceived in the long period from 1978, when he joined the EUI,
until its publication in 1991), became a central piece of constitutional imaginary
that dominated the period after the fall of communism (as the events of 1989 are
commonly called).
It was an imaginary which mostly borrowed from liberal, United-States-inspired
constitutionalism that resonated globally at the time. It was a structure for a new
world order at the ‘end of history’. It put emphasis on individual freedom, its juridical
guarantees, and a free market economy. Copenhagen criteria expressed this
imaginary at the political level, while the Washington consensus embodied its
economic dimension.
In the context of the EU, this liberal constitutional imaginary functioned as a utopia:
something that still was not true for the EU at the time but was widely considered
worth pursuing. In Old Europe it was the utopia of ‘an Ever Closer Union’, in the
post-communist Europe the same imaginary marked the return from ‘abduction
to the East’, as the Soviet domination was described by the Czech writer Milan
Kundera.
The same imaginary functioned as an ideology too, however. ‘The Ever Closer
Union’ does not ask who in the end bears the burden of bringing ‘poor cousins’
back to old Europe. It also made the return to Europe something that could not be
questioned by those who suffered from the massive restructuring of the economy
required by that.
The Failure of European Economic
Constitutionalism
Someone reading the book under discussion may wonder whether there is some
link to the recent movement for law and political economy, which started some
five or so years ago in the United States. In 2016 Texas Law Review published a
symposium entitled ‘Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy’. At about the same
time Law and Political Economy Blog was established. The point of ‘reclaiming’
was to overcome a ‘Great Forgetting’ of questions of political economy, despite
the interest which e.g. Critical Legal Studies took into issues of social justice and
material inequality as created and sustained by liberal law.
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A European observer may think, mistakenly, that this call to reclaim constitutional
political economy is (yet another) parochial American affair. After all, we not only
have people who have studied European Economic Constitution (besides Christian
Joerges particularly Julio Baquero Cruz and Miguel Poiares Maduro); the whole
study of EU law has always put the internal market at its centre. To think about
European constitutionalism without the market would be unimaginable.
And yet precisely this has been happening, and our predicament may not be
that different from our colleagues across the Atlantic (at least when it comes to
the intellectual condition of our discipline; materially there is more than an ocean
separating our and their world). How comes?
As argued before, the mainstream constitutional law and theory of the EU benignly
neglected the questions of political economy. However, there is one gap in
“economic constitutionalism” as well: one, which may keep its many insights outside
the mainstream debate. It is built on the separation between law and economy.
As described by Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson, it seeks to define the
‘proprium’ of each. Analytically it may make sense, however, only to a point. The
separation may hide from sight how many of the ‘legal-constitutional’ questions are
in fact issues with an important political-economic dimension and vice versa.
To give some examples of each: only very few people have noticed that the debate
on the ‘rule of law’ and the principle of primacy, apparently threatened by the
German Federal Constitutional Court in Weiss, was overlooking (or glossing over)
the impossibility of the status quo, helplessly maintained by the ECB and the ECJ. It
may be a constitutional travesty to try to justify the principle of primacy with reference
to equality among the member states, when the same law produces so unequal
effects for them.
Relatedly, all the fighters for the rule of law and democracy in the post-communist
Europe should start asking how much economic injustice there is, the real, not only
“perceived” by those who suffer as a result of their country’s race back to Europe.
The rule of liberal law may then start appearing as an ideology which imposes un-
freedom. Orbán or Kaczynski may start looking as ‘liberators’ (fake, needless to say
– but what is the alternative?)
On the other hand, there seems to be consensus on the need to keep economic
and monetary policy in the hands of economic experts. This is not something with a
democratic/constitutional dimension, unless we want to allow populist politicians to
play with the rules of the game determined by economic science. Again, imaginaries
play a big role in such beliefs.
The recent article by some of the people behind the Law and Economic Blog,
published by Yale Law Journal concludes:
a legal imaginary of democratic political economy, that takes seriously
underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, can inform a wave
of legal thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify and
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accelerate these movements for structural reform- and, if we are lucky, help
remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways.
I think the volume is a first step in the right direction, but to put the whole new way
of thinking about law of political economy, new intellectual and disciplinary coalitions
will have to be formed – and new imaginaries construed. We need to move beyond
Fiesole.
- 5 -
